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Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt Edward J. Kane
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Resumen
En las últimas décadas, el seguro explícito a los depósitos ha cundido con rapidez, más recientemente
hacia los países con bajo grado de desarrollo financiero e institucional. Este trabajo documenta el
alcance de las diferencias de diseño de los seguros de depósitos entre distintos países y revisa la
evidencia empírica sobre la forma en que ciertos rasgos particulares del diseño afectan la disciplina
del mercado, la estabilidad de la banca, el desarrollo financiero y la eficacia de la solución de crisis.
Esta evidencia cuestiona la conveniencia de alentar a los países a que adopten seguros explícitos de
depósitos sin antes detenerse a evaluar y remediar las debilidades de sus sistemas de información y
supervisión. También se incluyen recomendaciones para reformar el sistema chileno de seguros de
depósitos basadas en los resultados de los estudios aquí examinados.
Abstract
Explicit deposit insurance has been spreading rapidly in the past decades, most recently to countries
with low levels of financial and institutional development.  This paper documents the extent of cross-
country differences in deposit-insurance design and reviews empirical evidence on how particular
design features affect private market discipline, banking stability, financial development, and the
effectiveness of crisis resolution.  This evidence challenges the wisdom of encouraging countries to
adopt explicit deposit insurance without first stopping to assess and remedy weaknesses in their
informational and supervisory environments. The paper also includes recommendations for reforming
the Chilean deposit insurance system based on the results of the research reviewed here.
__________________
This essay is based on a previously published paper, which provides an extensive review of the research results;
see Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002). We would like to thank Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel and Iván Gómez for useful
comments and discussion. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely
those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or
the countries they represent.
E-mail: ademirguckunt@worldbank.org.1
INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, systemic banking crises have afflicted
developed and developing countries alike. A systemic crisis occurs when
widespread depositor runs reveal that most or all of the accounting capital
in a country’s banking system is illusory. Systemic crisis have hit ninety-
three countries, and borderline crises have afflicted forty-six countries.
Numerous countries have suffered several crises.
Banking crises are costly and disruptive. As measured by the increased debt
generated in the crisis year, fiscal costs incurred in 1997–98 crises
exceeded 30 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in Thailand and Korea and
50 percent in Indonesia. The true cost of a crisis, however, far exceeds its
immediate fiscal cost. Severe banking crises may derail macroeconomic
stabilization programs, slow future growth, and increase poverty. During a
crisis, depositors typically lose the use of their balances, and would-be
borrowers and equity issuers find that financial markets have dried up.
Working-class and retired households may be forced into a hand-to-mouth
existence, and good borrowers and sound banks may lose access to credit and
be forced into bankruptcy. Diminished confidence in domestic financial
institutions may fuel a panicky flight of foreign and domestic capital and a
severe currency crisis.
To control these costs, policymakers erect a financial safety net. The net
seeks both to make a systemic financial breakdown less likely and to limit
the damage done when one occurs. Deposit insurance is a critical component of
such safety nets. Establishing explicit deposit insurance guarantees has come
to be seen as one of the pillars on which any truly modern financial system
must be built. Indeed, the number of countries offering explicit deposit
insurance has almost tripled during the last decades. Today, most OECD
countries and an increasing number of developing countries feature explicit
depositor protection.
The popularity of explicit deposit insurance may give the misleading
impression that designing and operating an efficient system is easy. Quite to
the contrary, safety-net managers are assigned conflicting objectives that
make their task very difficult. They are asked not only to protect against
financial crises and related economic shocks, but also to avoid subsidizing
bank risk-taking lest they foster inefficient bank risk-taking and other
imprudent banking practices. The central challenge safety-net managers face
is to strike an appropriate balance between preventing crises and at the same
time controlling bank risk-taking.
Given the difficulties involved in designing and operating a safety net,
policymakers often seek expert advice on how best to design an explicit
deposit insurance system. Expert advice needs to be grounded in carefully
interpreted cross-country empirical evidence. A recent World Bank research
project developed such a database for researchers worldwide and answered
questions about how explicit deposit insurance affects four items: financial
stability, how markets discipline bank risk-taking, the development of the
overall financial system, and crisis management. This paper, which is based
on  Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002), provides a synthesis of this research
effort. The next section characterizes the dataset and uses it to summarize
the extent of cross-country differences in deposit insurance design. Section
2 then summarizes the empirical evidence on the impact of deposit insurance.
Section 3 combines a short description of the Chilean deposit insurance
system with a list of features that cross-country research suggests that
Chile should keep or alter. Section 4 concludes by restating our policy
implications as principles.2
1. THE RISE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE AROUND THE WORLD
Deposit insurance can be explicit or merely implicit. Implicit insurance
exists to the extent that the political incentives that shape a government’s
reaction to crisis make a taxpayer bailout of insolvent banks seem
inevitable. Explicit deposit insurance has spread rapidly in recent years.
The number of countries offering explicit deposit guarantees surged from
twelve in 1974 to seventy-one in 1999 (see figure 1). Establishing explicit
deposit insurance has become a principal feature of policy advice on
financial architecture that outside experts give to countries undergoing
reform (Folkerts-Landau and Lindgren, 1998; Garcia, 1999).
[figure 1 about here]
It is not hard to see why deposit insurance appeals to policymakers. In the
short run, government accountants can book income from periodic insurance
premiums without acknowledging the parallel buildup of formal obligations
that guarantees create. Such one-sided accounting paints deposit insurance as
a costless way of reducing the threat of bank runs. Other attractions include
protecting small depositors and improving opportunities for small domestic
banks to compete with larger national and foreign institutions. In programs
of privatization or post-crisis restructuring, explicit deposit insurance is
sometimes adopted to curtail the size of implicit guarantees. When banks were
previously either government-owned or given blanket guarantees, limiting the
maximum size of balances covered by deposit insurance is an important goal.
A cross-country database developed as part of the World Bank research
program characterizes deposit insurance arrangements in 178 countries
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Sobaci, 2001). This database documents how widely deposit
insurance design varies across countries. For example, account coverage
varies from unlimited guarantees to tight coverage limits. Japan, Mexico, and
Turkey promise 100 percent depositor coverage, whereas countries like Chile,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom cover individual deposits up to an amount
that is actually less than their per capita GDP. Also, although many
countries cover deposits denominated in foreign currency, most schemes
exclude interbank deposits. Besides setting a maximum level of coverage, some
countries insist that accountholders coinsure a proportion of their deposit
balances. Coinsurance provisions are still relatively rare, but they are
increasingly  frequent in recently adopted schemes.
Deposit insurance obligations are typically advance-funded, most commonly
from a blend of government and bank sources. To allow the insurer to build
and maintain an appropriate fund of reserves against its loss exposures, such
countries generally assess their banks an annual premium that is based
entirely or in large part on the amount of insured deposits. Efforts to make
these annual premiums sensitive to bank risk exposure have begun in recent
years.
Insurance schemes are typically managed in a government agency or in a
public-private partnership. A few countries, such as Argentina, Germany, and
Switzerland, manage their schemes privately. Finally, membership is
compulsory for chartered banks in almost all countries; the most notable
exception is Switzerland.
Table 1 records countries that either established or extensively revised
their deposit insurance scheme during the second half of the 1990s. A number
of countries adopted or expanded their deposit insurance scheme as a crisis-
management measure. For example, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand moved to
blanket coverage in response to their recent crises. The 1990s saw a rapid
spread in transitional countries—perhaps partly motivated by their long-term
interest in joining the European Union—and in some African countries.
Countries that adopted deposit insurance in 1999 are Ecuador, El Salvador,3
and members of the Central African Currency Union, namely, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Republic of Congo. Most
of these new schemes show generous coverage levels. For example, Central
African Republic and Chad offer coverage ratios that lie between 13 and 15
times their per capita GDP.
[table 1 about here]
Precisely because the range of design features is so extensive, this
dataset can permit analysts to compare and contrast how well different
features work in different circumstances. In the next section, we summarize
the implications of research that uses this database to make inferences about
key deposit insurance issues.
2. DEPOSIT INSURANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
An extensive theoretical literature analyzes the benefits and costs of
deposit insurance and explores the challenge of balancing these benefits and
costs to produce an optimal deposit insurance system.  This literature has
been summarized by Kane (2000), Calomiris (1996), and others.
Cross-country empirical evidence on the efficiency of real-world deposit
insurance systems is harder to come by. We begin this section by posing four
empirical questions whose answers indicate how effective an individual
country’s deposit insurance system happens to be. Specifically, how does
deposit insurance affect bank stability? How does deposit insurance affect
market discipline? How does deposit insurance impact financial development?
What role does deposit insurance play in managing crises?
2.1 Deposit Insurance and Banking Crises
Economic theory offers a mixed message on how deposit insurance affects
banking stability. On the one hand, credible deposit insurance contributes to
financial stability by making depositor runs less likely. On the other hand,
unless insured institutions’ capital positions and risk-taking are supervised
carefully, the insurer will  accrue loss exposures that undermine bank
stability in the long run. Economists label insurance-induced risk-taking as
moral hazard. Moral hazard occurs because sheltering risk-takers from the
negative consequences of their behavior increases their appetite for risk.
The need to control moral hazard in banking has been emphasized by academics,
but dismissed or denigrated by many policymakers.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2003) are the first to use the cross-county
database to study the link between deposit insurance and financial crises.
They use data from sixty-one countries for the period 1980–97 to estimate a
model of banking crisis. After controlling for other determinants, they find
that the presence of poorly designed explicit deposit insurance tends to
increase the likelihood that a country will experience a banking crisis; they
show that this result does not appear to be driven by reverse causality.1 On
investigating individual design features, Demirgüç-Kunt and  Detragiache also
show that deposit insurance causes the most trouble in countries where
coverage is extensive, where authorities amass a large fund of explicit
                        
1. The countries that introduce deposit insurance as a result of a crisis do not drive these
results, because observations for the crisis period are dropped from the sample. As further
evidence on this point, the authors go on to estimate a two-stage model where they first estimate
the probability of adopting explicit deposit insurance and employ this estimated variable in a
second-stage crisis equation. The first-stage results indicate that countries in the sample
decide to adopt deposit insurance because other countries adopt it, as it becomes perceived to be
best practice. In the second stage, deposit insurance variables become even more significant,
indicating that allowing for potential endogeneity does not alter the results.4
reserves and earmark it for insolvency resolution, and where the scheme is
administered by government officials rather than the private sector. Finally,
they also show that the contribution of deposit insurance to bank fragility
is significant in countries where the institutional environment is
underdeveloped, but it is not significant in countries whose environment is
strong. These findings support the hypothesis that where the contracting
environment controls incentive conflict, effective prudential regulation and
supervision can offset the adverse incentives created by deposit insurance so
that moral hazard need not be worrisome.
2.2 Deposit Insurance and Market Discipline
In environments characterized by a high degree of transparency, depositors
can discipline banks that engage in excessive risk-taking by demanding higher
deposit interest rates or by withdrawing their deposits. However, to the
extent that deposit insurance reduces the stake that depositors have in
monitoring and policing bank capital and loss exposures, it shifts
responsibility for controlling bank risk-taking to the regulatory system.
Bank performance is undermined wherever deposit insurance managers displace
more discipline than they exert.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003) build a bank-level dataset covering
forty-three countries over 1990–97, which they use to study depositor
discipline by looking at interest rates and deposit growth. The evidence
shows that explicit insurance lowers banks’ interest expenses and makes
interest payments less sensitive to bank risk, particularly liquidity.
However, regardless of the character of a country’s safety net, some market
discipline survives. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga also focus on how  variation
in design characteristics affect market discipline. They find that market
discipline is stronger in countries with higher levels of institutional
development. Nevertheless, badly designed deposit insurance curtails market
discipline even in countries whose institutional development is strong.
Setting higher coverage limits, extending coverage to  interbank deposits,
establishing an ex ante fund of reserves, funding reserves from government
sources, and insisting on public management each displaces market discipline.
On the other hand, market discipline is enhanced by coinsurance provisions,
covering foreign currency deposits, and establishing private or joint
management of the insurance enterprise.
Such individual-bank data provide direct evidence of the way in which
deposit insurance design can affect bank risk-taking incentives. Although
deposit insurance displaces market discipline even in advanced countries, the
net effect may be improved by strong regulation and supervision. These
findings reinforce the evidence on deposit insurance and banking crises and
accord with cross-country variation in the risk-shifting incentives that one
can infer from bank stock prices ( Hovakimian, Kane, and  Laeven, 2003).
Countries with poor contracting environments are apt to suffer adverse
consequences from deposit insurance.
2.3 Deposit Insurance and Financial Development
Countries adopt deposit insurance for different reasons. One common goal,
however, is to augment the flow of bank credit by increasing the confidence
that the general public has in the formal banking system and to do this
without having to explicitly set aside or expend current fiscal resources. To
the extent that deposit insurance bolsters depositors’ faith in the stability
of the banking system, it may mobilize household savings for use by the
financial system. Earlier research shows that financial development supports5
improved patterns of real investment and leads to  sustainably higher
aggregate economic growth (Levine, 1997).
Recent adopters of deposit insurance include African and Latin American
countries with low levels of financial development.
 To investigate whether and
how explicit deposit insurance contributes to financial development, Cull,
Senbet, and Sorge (2003) examine time-series data for fifty-eight countries.
These authors find that explicit deposit insurance has a favorable impact on
the level of financial activity and its volatility only in the presence of
strong institutional development. In institutionally weak environments,
deposit insurance appears to distort the pattern of real investment and to
retard, rather than promote, financial development.
2.4 Deposit Insurance and Crisis Management
It is common practice to issue blanket guarantees to arrest a banking
crisis. Countries that have adopted this strategy include Sweden (1992),
Japan (1996), Thailand (1997), Korea (1997), Malaysia (1998), and Indonesia
(1998). More recently, Turkey tried to halt its financial panic by
guaranteeing not just bank depositors, but all domestic and foreign
nondeposit creditors of Turkish banks. Advocates of using blanket guarantees
to halt a systemic crisis argue that sweeping guarantees can be helpful, even
essential, in halting depositors’ flight to quality. However, because blanket
guarantees create an expectation of their future use in similar
circumstances, they undermine market discipline and may prove greatly
destabilizing over longer periods. Although some countries have managed to
scale back formal insurance coverage once a crisis has receded, it is very
difficult to scale back informal coverage in a credible manner.
Honohan and Klingebiel (2003) analyze the impact of blanket guarantees and
other crisis-management strategies on the ultimate fiscal cost of resolving
banking-system distress. Data covering forty crises around the world indicate
that unlimited depositor guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, and
regulatory forbearance significantly increase the ultimate fiscal cost of
resolving a banking crisis. Moreover, these authors find no trade-off between
fiscal costs and the speed of economic recovery. In their sample, depositor
guarantees and regulatory forbearance failed to significantly reduce either
crisis duration or the crisis-induced decline in aggregate real output.
Providing liquidity support for insolvent institutions appears to prolong a
crisis by destabilizing bank-lending incentives so extensively  that healthy
adjustments are delayed and additional output loss is generated.
3. LESSONS FOR CHILE
Deposit insurance was established in Chile in 1986. The system does not
have a permanent fund in place. The Chilean Central Bank guarantees 100
percent of demand deposits in full, and 90 percent of household savings and
time deposits up to UF 120 per person (approximately US$ 2,800). To limit the
Central Bank’s exposure, banks with demand deposits in excess of 2.5 times
the capital reserves are required to maintain 100 percent reserves at the
Central Bank in short-term central bank or government securities. Foreign
exchange deposits are covered, but coverage excludes  interbank deposits.
Membership is compulsory for all banks, and the scheme is publicly
administered.
Two features of the Chilean economy must be highlighted before we can
discuss the implications of our research for Chile. First, within the
universe of developing countries, Chile has a highly advanced level of6
institutional development. For example, on a six-point  scale measuring
adherence to the rule of law, Chile scores a five. This means that Chile’s
citizens trust its legal system. On an index measuring the protection of
property rights, Chile obtains the highest possible score of five. Government
corruption is among the lowest in the developing world: Chile scores a four
on a six-point scale in which higher scores indicate an absence of
corruption.2 This profile makes it reasonable to rate the Chilean
institutional environment as strong enough to support an explicit deposit
insurance system whose design can keep moral hazard in check.
Second, Chile has a very concentrated banking system. Its top five banks
hold 71 percent of domestic banking assets. Concentrated banking systems
experience fewer systemic banking crises (Beck,  Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine,
2003) and almost always generate a high level of implicit insurance coverage,
partly because of “too big to fail” pressures. Not surprisingly, empirical
evidence confirms that incremental exposure to moral hazard from introducing
an explicit insurance system is limited in highly concentrated environments.
Taken together, Chile’s institutional development and banking concentration
promise to limit any adverse impact that explicit deposit insurance might
have on the Chilean economy. Still, the better the design, the more
efficiently the country’s scarce savings will be allocated.
Research on the design of deposit insurance has some clear implications for
Chile. First, with regard to coverage, it is important to set enforceable
limits so as to provide depositors and other creditors with strong incentives
to monitor bank risk-taking. For this reason, Chile is to be complimented for
keeping the coverage of term deposits low (coverage is currently less than
per capita GDP), for imposing coinsurance so that each depositor is
responsible for losses on the first 10 percent of its deposits, and for
denying coverage to  interbank deposits. These features strengthen private
monitoring. The system would be even stronger, however, if demand deposits
were not fully covered. Although the Central Bank limits its loss exposure on
these deposits by imposing 100 percent reserve requirements above a specified
size limit, a massive shift from time deposits to demand deposits could occur
in the event of a financial crisis. Such a shift would effectively transmit
full coverage to all depositors. Given that only 30 percent of total deposits
is currently covered by insurance, sudden shifts could generate large
increases in coverage at the worst possible time. A potential solution would
be to impose a strict coverage limit on demand deposits.
A second positive feature is that the insurer has no explicit reserve fund.
Research indicates that earmarking large amounts of funds for insolvency
resolution distorts the incentives of market participants. However, making
the Central Bank of Chile the only party responsible for covering losses from
insolvencies is a dangerous feature. Unless the insured banks truly expect to
pay for their mistakes, they have very little incentive either to curb their
own excessive risk taking or to monitor one another. If, instead, authorities
made it clear that funds to cover bank losses would come from surviving
banks, Chilean banks could monitor one another effectively, since the banking
system is concentrated and the quality and quantity of information are very
high. This is a second improvement that could be introduced into the system.
Third, the Chilean system wisely insists on compulsory membership.
Compulsory membership is advisable since it allows risk pooling and prevents
stronger members from abandoning the scheme.
Finally, Chile has opted to let government officials run the deposit
insurance system. Research  indicates, however, that enlisting some layers of
                        
2. The U.S. corruption index is also four.  Indices for corruption and rule of law are
produced by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), and the index for property rights is
produced by the Heritage Foundation.7
private management promises to improve system performance.  Private parties
tend to be better at monitoring loss exposures and initiating loss-control
efforts in a timely manner.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Cross-country evidence is disturbing because, unlike Chile, many of the
countries that have recently installed explicit insurance have poor
contracting environments. What makes this research timely is that 60 percent
of the countries in the world still have not adopted explicit deposit
insurance. In Africa, for example, where the institutional environment is the
least developed, only nine of the continent’s more than fifty countries offer
explicit insurance.
Cross-country empirical research indicates that, for now, officials in many
countries would do well to resist the siren call of explicit deposit
insurance. Explicit insurance must be handled with care because it reduces
the incentive for depositors to monitor the riskiness of their banks. Studies
show that in institutionally weak environments, deposit insurance design is
apt to be defective, intensifying rather than reducing the probability and
depth of future crises. Unless the insurer can effectively replace the
monitoring that its guarantees displace, formal guarantees tend to encourage
excessive risk-taking. Banks can raise funds from depositors at interest
rates that are much lower than the yields at which their high-risk loan
portfolios deserve to be funded. Depositors are apt to tolerate aggressive
bank lending as long as they remain secure in the knowledge that whether or
not bank loans pay off, their claims to repayment are protected by credible
deposit insurance.
Explicit insurance can only help develop a robust financial system when the
insurance scheme is well designed and when the local contracting environment
embodies reliable institutions of loss control. The difficulty is one of
sequencing. In a country with weak controls, explicit deposit insurance can,
at best, spur financial development only in the very short run. Formal
guarantees undermine longstanding patterns of bank bonding and depositor
discipline. Over longer periods, the loss of private discipline is likely to
reduce bank solvency, destroy real economic capital, increase financial
fragility, and deter financial development.
For countries that have already installed or are in the process of
designing an explicit deposit insurance scheme, cross-country empirical
research identifies four principles of good design. No government can afford
to neglect these principles. No matter how strong a country’s institutional
environment might be, weaknesses in deposit insurance design fuel financial
fragility by undermining the discipline that banks receive from private
parties. The following four design features have proved useful in controlling
and offsetting these effects.
The most straightforward of these principles of good design entails setting
enforceable coverage limits. The goal is to ensure that private monitoring
complements official supervision: to convince large depositors, subordinated
debt holders, and correspondent banks that their funds are truly and
inescapably at risk. Providing strong incentives for private parties to bond
and police bank risk exposures is critically important in contracting
environments in which government policing threatens to be deficient.
A second principle is to make membership in the deposit insurance system
compulsory. This increases the size of the insurance pool and prevents strong
institutions from selecting out of the system when it needs to be
recapitalized.8
A third principle supported by cross-country evidence is to make the public
and private sectors jointly responsible for overseeing the scheme. A public-
private partnership establishes checks and balances that improve management
performance.
The fourth and final principle is to limit the fund’s ability to shift its
losses to the general taxpayer. Regardless of whether the insurer holds a
formal fund of reserves, it must be made clear that funds to cover bank
losses will come principally from surviving banks, except in the most extreme
circumstances. Taxpayer assistance should be expected only in the special
case of a profound crisis.
Deposit insurance is neither always good nor always bad. Depending on its
design, it can be a useful part of a country’s overall system of bank
regulation and financial markets. Cross-country research by no means implies
that every country with an explicit system should close it down at the first
opportunity. Rather, the research stresses the importance of identifying and
fostering informative accounting standards and reliable procedures for
contract enforcement before adopting deposit insurance. It also underscores
the importance of planning to intelligently re-adapt the insurer’s loss-
control system to close loopholes opened by financial innovation. Like any
strong medicine, users must ensure that the side effects of the prescription
are not worse than the course of the disease they intend to treat.9
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